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Introduction 
 
The questions relating to ‘what to produce’ and ‘how to produce’ public services in a 
metropolitan area with multiple jurisdictions have been the central theme of research 
among the scholars of local government for the past 50 years. While ‘what to produce’ is 
a ‘provision’ question; ‘how to produce’ is a ‘production’ question. These are two 
different dimensions in the supply of public services. Efficient provision of services 
requires matching of residents’ preference with decisions relating to what to produce, 
how much to produce, and of what standard; matching service cost with financing (fiscal 
equivalence); regulation of private sector for public provision; and governing rules for 
citizen choices in organizing governments. This in principle results numerous and often 
overlapping multiple governments such as counties, municipalities, school districts, or 
special districts. On the other hand, efficient production of services is associated with, 
what economists call, ‘technical efficiency’ – the efficient transformation of inputs into 
outputs or services – forcing local governments to look for organization of production 
units that are most cost efficient in the production and delivery of public services. The 
efficient organization of production of a good or service is subject to the economies of 
scale in production, and internalization of externalities (social costs and benefits) 
associated with a service. Such economies of scale and externalities differ from service to 
service. The efficient production units, thus, vary with services in question. 
 
In metropolitan areas, the structure of the production side of a local public economy tends 
to be different from the provision side (ACIR, 1992). Two streams of literature suggested 
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two different policy solutions to solve this dilemma. Consolidation literature argued for 
regional government which will be able to aggregate peoples’ preferences, address the 
issue of fiscal equivalence, and take into account the economies of scale and inter-
jurisdictional externalities generated by fragmented smaller governments. For them size 
and efficiency are positively related. Public choice literature, on the other hand, called for 
regional governance. To them different public services generate different scale of effects 
(benefits or costs), fiscal capacity to provide the services is not evenly distributed, citizen 
preferences for public services are diverse, and these conditions, including technology, 
vary with place and time. Such diversity and dynamic nature of the conditions demands 
various governance arrangements to respond to the conditions as they evolve. Local 
government can organize production through various arrangements including in-house 
production, intergovernmental and private contracts, coordinated or joint production, 
franchises, vouchers, and voluntary production (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977). Each 
jurisdiction may take independent action, or two or more jurisdiction may agree to take 
various forms of coordinated action depending on the nature of the problem of public 
service delivery. The public choice theorists maintain that the diversity among services is 
such that no organization is the right size to produce all of them efficiently (Bish, 2000), 
and there is no one best system for all local public economies (Ostrom, 2005)1. 
Since there is no one organization of right size to produce all the public services, we see 
various production arrangements including in-house production, private contracting, and 
                                                 
1 The debate between metropolitan-wide government (consolidation) and metropolitan governance is still 
on. Downs (New Visions for Metropolitan America,1994) calls for a metropolitan government to address 
the complex metropolitan problem. Oakerson, argues for a vision of “civic metropolis”- a governance idea 
that sees metropolitan areas as complex local public economies, not dominated by any single government 
unit but governed through the integrating efforts of civil societies, adapting their institutions in response to 
a succession of problems (Oakerson, 1999, p. 13). 
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inter-local contracting and joint production in order to capture efficiency. Inefficient 
production arrangements (choices) may lead to various economic and social costs such as 
duplication, underinvestment (or underprovision of services) in case of external costs 
(pollution or congestion) or external benefits (such as health and education benefits to 
other residents) resulting from the provision of a service, and loss of the economies of 
scale. ACIR (1992) notes that the decision making process may include cooperation, 
contracting, collusion, competition, conflict, negotiation and conflict resolution, 
rulemaking and enforcement, problem solving, and “buck passing”. Cities recognize 
these problems of service production. They outsource almost half of the service they 
provide; and joint provision of services/or inter-local contracting constitute about one-
sixth of total services in cities in 1997 (Warner and Hefetz, 2001). The need for 
coordinated action in local service delivery, either in the form of service exchange or in 
the form of joint production arrangements, creates an “institutional collective action” 
problem where cooperation could potentially improve policy outcome for participating 
jurisdictions. However, the diversity of services might generate different collective action 
problems. Since coordinated action requires interaction among jurisdictions, the question 
is: is there a predictable association between the service and the structure of interactions 
among jurisdictions in local service production? What determines such forms of 
interactions? These are the questions of interest of this paper.  
 
 
Service characteristics, networks, and inter-local cooperation in service production 
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Tiebout’s classic model (1956) captured only competitive dimension of local government 
behavior in public service delivery. He argued that, in a fragmented setting, local 
governments will compete among themselves leading to efficient package of service and 
cost; otherwise, people will recourse to exit with their feet. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 
(1961) recognized the complexity of local public service delivery: the mismatch between 
appropriate scale of provision and production units as well as non-matching of 
jurisdiction with the scale effect of services. They suggested that multiplicity of local 
governments and governance arrangements are the natural response to address such 
complexity, and, thus, both patterns of competition and cooperation could be observable 
in metropolitan areas depending on the nature of the problem in service delivery.  
 
There is rich theoretical and empirical research on individual collective action, 
particularly in common pool resource-type settings. These research show that individual 
do come together voluntarily to solve the collective problems they face (Ostrom, 1990). 
The basic idea of collective action is simple. The collective action occurs if the benefit of 
collective action is greater than the cost of collective action. The costs of collective action 
are the cost of communication, negotiation, and coordination; the cost of uncertainty; and 
the cost of enforcement associated with credibility or trust problems meeting the jointly 
agreed obligations. The idea of ‘institutional collective action’ is an extension of the 
works on ‘individual collective action’ (Feiock, 2004). Here again the idea is that, like 
individuals, institutions also work together to solve policy problems that require 
coordination or joint actions. The social capital was considered the key variable in 
solving collective action as it would reduce cost of collective action (Coleman, 1988; 
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Feiock et. al., 2004); and characteristics of actors, their preferences, and iterative 
interaction between actors (Ostrom, 1990) were considered important determinants of 
social capital. However, the primary focus of these works was on stressing the need for 
building social capital for solving collective problem, not on understanding the 
interaction pattern between or among actors that may have been generated out of the 
particular nature of the joint problem linked to a particular service.  
 
Contracting literature on public services, too, concentrated on explaining the 
determinants of single actor’s choice on producing in-house or outsourcing (mainly 
private sector), or on moving from in-house to different production arrangements 
including private-for-profit, non-for-profit, and public agencies (Nelson, 1997;Jossart-
Marcelli and Musso, 2005). Although this literature recognized the importance of service 
type (not necessarily service characteristics) in municipal choices in service 
arrangements, it overlooked the coordinated and/or joint action between actors and their 
interactive behavior on choices of public service provision. Ostrom and her associates’ 
seminal study of the patterns of police service delivery (Ostrom  et. al., 1978) 
demonstrated that the efficient police service production was associated with polycentric 
police agencies where agencies engage into various production arrangements including 
cooperation among themselves at local and/or regional level depending on the nature and 
type of activities (within the police service) having different level of economies of scale 
benefits. These findings were further supported by studies of delivery of fire services 
(Ahlbrandt, 1973), and solid waste services (Collins and Downes, 1977). These studies 
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too focused on the jurisdictions as the primary unit of analysis, not the inter-jurisdictional 
interaction.  
 
Network literature explicitly focuses on inter-relationship as the unit of analysis of a 
social phenomenon and helps to understand not only why there is a certain pattern of 
networks (as an outcome), but also the effect of networks (as an input) on policy 
outcomes. A number of research on public policy and management network2 shows 
increasing evidence of inter-organizational networks, particularly at local level, in diverse 
areas such as delivery of (mental health) services (Provan and Milward, 1995), adoption 
of economic development policies and programs (Agranoff and McGuire, …. , 2003), 
emergence of watershed partnerships (Lubell, et al., 2002), and development of regional 
partnerships (Feiock et al., 2004). Research has increasingly revealed that ‘entities in 
public economy engage in extensive horizontal as well as vertical interrelationships; and 
the structure and performance of public economy must be examined at an inter-
organizational level of analysis rather than just at the level of a single unit’ (Ostrom, 
2005). These studies mainly used networks as explanatory variables.  
 
 
Determinants of inter-jurisdictional networks in service delivery  
 
Although as of now there is no direct empirical research aiming to explore the association 
between the service characteristics and the patterns of inter-organizational relations, 
                                                 
2 Berry et al., (2004) distinguishes three stream of network literature: a) sociological networks, b) policy 
networks, and c) public management networks. 
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service delivery studies do indicate that different dimensions of services have bearing on 
the types of provision arrangements. There is no unanimity among scholars as to how one 
should classify the dimensions of the services in empirical investigations. However, 
literature seems to focus on two broad dimensions: a) types (categories) of services, and 
b) characteristics of services. Majority of studies dealing with alternative service delivery 
followed types or category of services (such as police, sewage, water, library, etc) along 
with characteristics of actors and institutions as explanatory variables for various 
production arrangements (Jossart-marcelli and Musso, 2005). Post (2000) approached the 
issue from the capital-intensive versus labor-intensive services (nature of the services) 
and showed that the likelihood of intergovernmental agreements is higher with former 
than the later. Savas (2000), although did not provide empirical evidence, suggested the 
importance of both dimensions in the choice of production arrangements. However, his 
classification of service is based on the excludability and jointness of consumption 
properties of goods and services and argued that specific production arrangement would 
depend on the attributes of the goods and services3. Bish (2000), in his service delivery 
study in British Columbia, further demonstrated the importance of both dimensions. 
Further, he argued that the analyst needs to analyze the provision arrangements at the 
“activity level”4 (not the functional level) with proper consideration of the characteristics 
                                                 
3 Ten such production arrangements suggested by Savas (2000, pp. 88-89) are government service, 
government vending, inter-governmental agreements, contracts, franchises, grants, vouchers, free market, 
voluntary service, and self-service. The attributes of the services mentioned are specificity of service, 
availability of producers, efficiency and effectiveness, scale of service, relating benefits and costs, 
responsive to consumers, susceptibility to fraud, economic equity, racial equity, responsiveness to 
government direction, and size of the government. However, all these attributes are not related to the good 
or service; some are related to characteristics of actors such as size of the government, and issues 
surrounding provision decisions such as efficiency, effectiveness, and equity (Savas, 2000, pp. 92-101). 
4 A service, for example police, is made up of many composite activities such as police patrol, emergency 
dispatch, crime investigation, training, crime lab, etc. ACIR (1992, p. 69) uses the term ‘service 
components’ for what Bish’s used for activities (Bish, 2000). 
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of the activity such as ‘production of a large capital facility’ (such as a land fill, a transit 
system) and ‘requirement for specialized equipment or personnel’ (e.g., legal expertise, 
computer maintenance) creating economies of scale in local government activities (Bish, 
2000, p. 79). The scale effect from the former characteristics is realized where serving a 
bigger population lowers cost per person. On the other hand, the scale benefit from 
specialized equipment or personnel results when ‘governments serving small populations 
do not need the service often enough to provide it efficiently in-house, but that provide 
specialized services to other governments or organizations’ (Bish, 2000, p. 79). These 
two characteristics are associated with Williamson’s characterization of ‘physical asset 
specificity’ and ‘human-asset specificity’ (Williamson, 1981) that are extensively used in 
explaining ‘make or buy’ decisions, or monitoring of contracts by municipalities (Nelson, 
1997; Brown and Potoski, 2003).  
 
Asset specificity and metering difficulty are transaction related characteristics. A public 
good or service is asset specific if it requires transaction related investments either in 
physical asset, or in specialized skills, or in specific process. Once such investment is 
made, they will have only limited or imperfect alternative uses for substantial period of 
time (Nelson, 1997). A public good or service with high asset specificity, hence, means 
large investment in physical assets or in specialized skills or equipment. Metering 
difficulty, on the other hand, is the degree of difficulty in metering or monitoring of 
quantity and/or quality of output or benefits of a service (Brown and Potoski, 2003). The 
outputs of some services or activities (components of a service) are more difficult to 
measure than others. For example, the outputs or benefits from sewer, water, or refuse 
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collection are easier to measure than the outputs of services such as fire, police, and 
emergency services. In the former case, the outputs are divisible, exclusion is possible, 
and costs can be allocated based on the benefits received. On the other hand, in the later 
case, outputs are not divisible, exclusion is difficult or not possible and there is no 
objective distribution of costs and benefits between partners and link between such costs 
and benefits. 
 
Bish (2000) pointed out that large/specialized investment in physical assets or skills or 
equipments is associated with the economies of scale benefits in relation to the 
population served; and, therefore, serves as a motivation for communities for coordinated 
or joint action. He, however, did not explain the real or perceived costs and uncertainties 
associated with asset specificity, either in the form of physical assets or skills or 
equipments. Such costs tend to vary with the size and socio-economic characteristics of 
the communities. Smaller communities, for example, generally lack ‘critical resources’ 
such as fund, skills or equipment for the production of services; thus, for the smaller 
communities the production of services by themselves is constrained by the lack or 
inadequacy of ‘critical resources’ or by the lack of economies of scale if fund is not a 
problem. These problems will be larger in case of fiscal stress and increasing population 
demanding for increased services. The costs for these communities are generally 
‘information search costs’ (as to who has the adequate critical resource), and ‘investment 
lock-up costs’5 limiting alternative uses of resources for other service needs. Other costs 
                                                 
5 Investment lock-up costs are perceived opportunity cost of the alternative uses of the investments 
intended for a particular service. These costs arise because of the lock-up of investment in a particular 
service (such as drainage or crime lab) for a long time; and these costs will be higher for communities that 
have high value for money (that is, those are fiscally stressed) and high time preference for other services.  
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are related to uncertainties or trust, in case of cooperative production arrangements with 
jurisdictions having adequate critical resources. These costs are any back-up costs in case 
of interruption of services from supplier governments or any higher or discriminatory 
price on service delivery due to the monopolistic environment of the supplier entities in 
cooperative production arrangements. Together these costs could be termed as ‘critical 
resource costs’. For larger communities along with fiscal capacity to produce services, 
the nature of costs and uncertainties associated with asset specificity are different. They 
face externalities such as congestion to its residents in the form of overcrowding on its 
roads or parks and environmental benefits to other residents because of pollution control 
or watershed programs. Because of high cost of exclusion, it creates free-rider problem. 
They might also have surplus capacity, at least in the short-run, due to large investment 
requirement in physical assets6. Besides, they might perceive risk of ‘investment hold-up’ 
arising out of the likely opportunistic behavior on the part of service receiving 
jurisdictions threatening the producing (or supplier) jurisdiction either to terminate the 
service agreement or renegotiate the terms after the investment is made for the increased 
level of service production. However, this risk is very low in case of very limited number 
of jurisdictions available with adequate critical resources to credibly produce the services 
to meet the needs of the partner jurisdictions. When dealing in private market, according 
to Williamson (1981), such costs would lead to vertical integration of firms in order to 
minimize the transaction costs in the private market. In the case of public market of local 
service delivery, jurisdictions tend to look for cooperative actions between or among 
                                                 
6 Generally when large investments are made, it is not only the present need but also the future need of at 
least medium term is taken into account in the provision of services with high asset specificity requiring 
large investments. This means that these investments will have surplus capacity at least in the short run to 
benefit from the economies of scale.  
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themselves to minimize such costs leading to efficient production of public services. 
Analogous to Williamson’s vertical integration, this is a scale integration of service 
production where jurisdictions wish to enhance efficiency while maintaining their 
autonomy.  
 
Metering difficulty is another important characteristic of services that has implications on 
production arrangements (Williamson, 1981). High metering difficulty generates the 
problems of free-riding and opportunistic behavior. These problems increase the 
transaction costs of cooperative action. Such costs are primarily negotiation costs relating 
to the distribution of benefits and costs, and monitoring and enforcement costs to curb 
free-riding or opportunism of actors. These costs very with the service (or its 
components) as ‘metering difficulty’ is different for different service or its components. 
In general, thus, cooperation is much easier to achieve for goods and services that are 
divisible and easily measured (Steinacker, 2004) as opposed to services whose outputs 
are not tangible or whose production is complex posing difficulty to write even a contract 
(Ferris and Graddy, 1986).  
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
As discussed above, different service or its component activities have different degree of 
asset specificity and metering difficulty. These characteristics result different collective 
action problems in service production which, in turn, lead to different patterns of 
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coordinated actions by jurisdictions in an attempt to solve those problems. Hence, one 
should expect a systematic association between the service characteristics and the 
patterns of inter-local cooperation in local service delivery.  
 
Scholz, Feiock, and Ahn (2005) suggest that ‘resource networks’ and ‘contract 
networks’7 are two layers of networked relationships in joint provision of services. 
Further, these two networks are related to information search problem and credibility 
problem leading to ‘weak-ties’ networks (Granovetter, 1973) and ‘strong-ties’ (or 
‘clustered’ or ‘dense’) networks respectively. The underlying logic is that different 
collective activity (or public service) generates different collective action problems that 
actors try to solve. In this process, they contact actors where they attempt to minimize 
information search cost; and once the relationship is formal (contract), they seek to 
minimize credibility problems related to the fulfillment of agreed obligations. What is 
missing (or overlooked) in between the service type and the consequent collective action 
problems associated with the service is the transactional characteristics of the service that 
generate these problems. The specific structure of inter-jurisdictional networks is, then, 
the response to solve such problems. 
 
Since distribution of ‘critical resources’ (funds, skills, or equipments) is uneven between 
jurisdictions; the smaller the jurisdiction, the more limiting the ability to produce the 
services (or its activities) that have high asset specificity such as sewer or water supply. 
                                                 
7 ‘Resource (or contact) networks’ emerge when actors (individuals or organizations) engage in contact 
with others and share critical information. ‘Contract networks’, on the other hand, result when actors enter 
into service agreements in which commitments of cooperating parties are identified (Scholz, Feiock, and 
Ahn, 2005). 
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They tend to look for cooperative production arrangements of such services with 
jurisdictions possessing adequate ‘critical resources’ in order to minimize their ‘critical 
resource costs’. This also gives reasonable assurance to smaller jurisdictions that the 
other party (the large jurisdiction) has enough capacity to produce and deliver services 
without interruption, for example. Larger jurisdictions also gain form such cooperation. 
In addition to scale benefits, they can minimize costs resulting from externalities and 
excess capacity, if any. These conditions provide sufficient incentives for both smaller 
and larger jurisdictions to cooperate that outweigh the risks associated with such 
relationships. When asset specificity of a service is low, it is plausible that the incentive 
for jurisdictions to cooperate is low as there is little or no economies of scale or 
externalities associated with the transaction of the service depending on how low the 
asset specificity is. In such circumstances, if there is a cooperative effort, one would 
expect cooperation between similar size jurisdictions. This may also mean that there 
could be more jurisdictions with ability to produce specialized services providing a 
condition to forge relationships for mutual benefits. This leads to following hypothesis 
with respect to asset specificity and network relationships: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the asset specificity of a service (or its component activities), 
the stronger concentration of the network ties between the smaller and a few large 
jurisdiction possessing adequate critical resource.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The lower the asset specificity of a service, the weaker the concentration of 
the network ties between the smaller and a few large jurisdictions. 
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 The relationship between metering difficulty of a service and the consequent network 
relationships among jurisdictions is much more straightforward. When metering 
difficulty is high, exclusion becomes very costly leading to opportunism and free-rider 
problems. The jurisdictions, hence, would want to have close ties (or cross ties) among 
each other to ensure compliance (or to minimize non-compliance) through watching each 
other. One would then expect to observe more joint cooperative production 
arrangements8. On the other hand, when metering difficulty of a service is low, the costs 
and benefits of the service can be easily measured making the exclusion possible for non-
payers of the benefits of the service. Here, one would observe more bilateral – a sort of 
service exchange – production arrangements between cooperating jurisdictions. Hence, 
following hypotheses regarding metering difficulty and network structure: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the metering difficulty, denser the ties among jurisdictions 
depicting joint production arrangements. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The lower the metering difficulty, the less dense the ties among jurisdiction 
exhibiting a tendency towards more bilateral cooperative arrangements.  
 
Besides these two separate dimensions of service characteristics, four combinations of 
these dimensions are also possible: a) high asset specificity with high metering difficulty, 
b) high asset specificity with low metering difficulty, c) low asset specificity with high 
                                                 
8 When looking at inter-jurisdictional relations for a set of diverse services, there could be the presence of 
‘multiplex networks’, that is, jurisdictions are inter-connected (or bonded) with each others through 
multiple cross service agreements that allow them watch for any opportunistic behavior.  
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metering difficulty, and d) low asset specificity with low metering difficulty. Following 
the single dimension logic of each characteristics, high asset specificity with high 
metering difficulty would project network relationships between smaller and a few large 
jurisdictions of denser ties. In case of high asset specificity with low metering difficulty, 
the relationship would tend to be still between smaller and a few large jurisdictions but of 
more bilateral form. On the other hand, service with low asset specificity and high 
metering difficulty would expect weaker concentration of ties between smaller and a few 
large jurisdictions but it would be denser. When asset specificity is low with low 
metering difficulty, the weaker concentration of ties between the smaller and large 
jurisdictions would tend to be less dense. Thus, the asset specificity tends to relate to 
whom to cooperate with (such as between smaller and a few large jurisdiction), whereas 
the metering difficulty is more associated with the form of relationships such as joint or 
bilateral. These four dimensions are shown in Annex 1. 
 
 
Research design 
 
In order to investigate the above questions, this paper follows a quantitative case study 
research design. The case study area is the Pinellas County in the state of Florida. The 
unit of analysis is inter-jurisdictional relation which is operationalized by ‘inter-local 
service agreements’. Formal inter-local agreements take various forms including 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Intergovernmental Agreements, Mutual Aid 
Agreements, and Joint Planning Agreements (LCIR, 2001b). Inter-local cooperation is 
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defined broadly to include formal cooperative production arrangements between two or 
more jurisdictions9. As the primary focus of this study is to determine the link between 
service characteristics and the structure of inter-jurisdictional relations associated with a 
particular service, the inter-jurisdictional relation is measured by network structures of 
the relations. It employs Network Analysis and uses UCINET to draw network diagrams 
and to calculate network measures. For analytical simplification, this paper uses only 
dyadic and undirected formal relationships between general-purpose local governments. 
Undirected relationship is simply the presence or absence of a relation; in this case, it is 
just the presence or absence of inter-local service agreements (ILAs). Hence, the value 
(for example, the number or frequency of agreements between jurisdictions) or the 
direction of the relation is not taken into account.  
 
The network size comprise of 25 actors comprising of only county and cities in county 
area. The presence of relationship is measured by ties. Two primary network measures 
were calculated to examine the hypotheses. The concentration of ties between 
jurisdictions is captured by network centrality, whereas the ties among jurisdictions are 
measured by network density. Centrality, in simple terms, is a measure of a ‘central 
point’ with a great many connections with other points. A point could be locally central 
or globally central in a graph. Degree centrality measures how well connected a point is 
within its local environment. Centralization, on the other hand, is related to the overall 
structure of the network graph; and it measures how tightly the graph is organized around 
                                                 
9 Inter-local cooperation is utilized through both informal and formal agreements. While there is no 
documentation of the extent of the presence of informal inter-local agreements, LCIR (2001b) views that 
large number of ‘paperless’ inter-local agreements still exits involving everything from ‘handshake’ 
commitments to provide emergency services to mutual understanding that one county will house another’s 
jailed inmates ‘upon verbal request’. 
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its most central point. Density is a measure of general level of linkages among the points 
in a graph. The more points connected to each other, the more dense will the graph be. 
This measure can vary from 0 to 1; the density of a complete graph being 1 (Scott, 
1991)10. The points in this analysis are the individual jurisdictions – the cities and the 
county in the Pinellas County.  
 
The analysis uses eight diverse services. They are fire, police, sanitary sewer, 
parks/recreation, potable water, solid waste, traffic signal, and street/road construction 
and maintenance11. The inter-local service agreements data is based on the Inter-Local 
Service Delivery Profile put together by the Pinellas County and submitted to the 
Department of Community Affairs (DCA) as a part of Florida Statutes requirement12. It 
covers mainly on-going agreements until January 2004. The measures for the asset 
specificity and metering difficulty come from the scales developed by Brown and Potoski 
(2003). These are average scales that range from 1 to 5; higher the points in scale, the 
higher the asset specificity and metering difficulty. Other socio-economic information 
comes from different reports and online websites of the concerned jurisdictions.  
 
 
Inter-local cooperation in service production in the Pinellas County 
                                                 
10 The concept and definition of measures are taken from Scott, 1991. 
11 The choice of the number and types of services was limited by the data availability. The inter-local 
service delivery profile included only education, potable water, sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, 
public safety, parks and recreation, and transportation. Education was excluded because it is mainly 
provisioned by School districts. Drainage was not included because of lack of asset specificity and 
metering difficulty measures to compare with the network measures.  
12 The purpose of this one time effort was to review service delivery coordination among jurisdictions 
within the County and to lay out plans to overcome coordination problems, if any.  Florida Statues required 
service coordination review only in selected key service areas.  
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 Governance and service coordination structure 
 
The Pinellas County is one of the 67 Counties in the State of Florida. Formed in May 
191113, it is a well-built and highly fragmented urban county in the Tampa-St. Petersburg 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). It has 24 cities and 36 special districts. Out of total 
population of 942, 41214, cities cover about 70 percent of the population. The Pinellas 
County area is very compact; jurisdictions in this area live in each other’s backyard15. 
In the State of Florida, Florida Statues provide broad legal framework for counties and 
cities to assume service provider role. Cities provide services in their incorporated areas, 
whereas counties provide services in the unincorporated areas. With the Florida 
constitutional amendment of County Home Rule in 1968, the counties become to be 
recognized as providers of urban-type services16. Over the years, local governments 
found inter-governmental (inter-local) coordination in service delivery as an effective 
means to deal with inter-jurisdictional externalities and the economies of scale for the 
efficient provision of local services to their residents. 
 
Although Florida’s statues are abound with the references to varying levels of 
intergovernmental coordination ranging from informal to formal as well as general 
pronouncements of legislative intent recognizing intergovernmental coordination as a 
valuable tool and goal for efficient government, Florida’s premier statues of 
                                                 
13 Legislative Committee on Intergovernmental Relations (LCIR), 2001a. 
14 2004 estimates by University of Florida. 
15 Observation made by the Pinellas County Planning Department Official during my visit there on August 
9, 2005. 
16 Pinellas County got Home Rule status in 1890 (LCIR, 2001a) 
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intergovernmental coordination at local level is Inter-local Cooperation Act of 1969 
(LCIR, 2001b, p. 23). This act authorized local government units to enter into inter-local 
agreements with public or private entities for the purpose of improving the efficiency 
and/or effectiveness of local governments (LCIR, 2001b)17. There is no specific incentive 
or disincentive built-in the State statutory provisions. These statutory provisions are 
primarily intended to facilitate voluntary cooperation between or among local 
jurisdictions. Thus, no overarching state policy exists to reward governmental entities 
who coordinate well and/or penalize those who do not (LCIR, 2001b, p. 27). So far the 
limited investigation on inter-local coordination in service delivery in Florida, mainly led 
by LCIR, primarily focused on intergovernmental coordination practices and challenges, 
and status and issues of functional transfer18. They did not look into structural patterns of 
inter-jurisdictional relationships arising out of the service specific characteristics.  
 
Network analysis and discussions 
 
There are altogether 258 inter-local agreements (ILAs) in eight service areas in the 
Pinellas County area. While the overall mean ILAs is just over 10, the distribution of 
ILAs varied with service area. The solid waste service has less than half mean ILA (0.36) 
whereas street service has more than two mean ILAs. Similarly, the mean ties also varied 
                                                 
17 Other acts facilitating inter-local agreements are Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land 
Development Regulation Act (Growth Management Act), Government Efficiency and Accountability 
Reform (adopted in law by the Legislature in 1999), and Government Conflict Resolution Act (LCIR, 
2001, pp. 23-25). 
18 Two such studies are Intergovernmental Coordination in Florida (LCIR, 2001) and Local Government 
Function and Formation in the Service Delivery Arena: Review of Relevant Research and Law (Florida 
Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1995). Broadly functional transfers are of two types: 
permanent functional transfers and temporary functional transfers. Permanent transfer occurs when 
functions permanently move to other entities such as special district, annexation, etc; whereas temporary 
transfers occur through inter-local service agreements. 
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significantly. While the crime prevention service has highest mean ties (8.28), 
parks/recreation has only about one mean tie. The distribution of ties by service is shown 
in Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of ILAs and Ties by  service    
Service No of ILAs 
No of ties - 
LG only Mean ILA Mean Ties 
Fire prevention 37 134 1.48 5.36 
Crime prevention 24 207 0.96 8.28 
Sanitary sewer 45 54 1.8 2.16 
Parks/recreation 29 18 1.16 0.72 
Potable water 24 42 0.96 1.68 
Solid waste 9 48 0.36 1.92 
Traffic signal  32 36 1.28 1.44 
Street/road 58 30 2.32 1.2 
  258 569 10.32 22.76 
 
 
The jurisdiction-wise distribution of ties is given in Annex 2. The distribution of ties by 
jurisdictions shows that the Pinellas County has the highest number of ties among all the 
existing ties. Other cities having most ties are the city of St. Petersburg, Pinellas Park, 
Clearwater and Largo. These ties also very by cities and by service. This is also reflected 
in the network graphs of the services included in the analysis. These graphs are presented 
in Annex 3. 
 
Table 2 below gives the calculated values of network centralization and network density 
along with the asset specificity and metering difficulty scales.  
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Table 2: Service characteristics and network measures by service 
Service 
Asset 
specificity 
Network 
centralization 
Metering 
difficulty 
Network 
density 
Fire prevention 3.80 61.78% 3.24 0.220 
Crime prevention 3.37 66.85% 3.60 0.340 
Sanitary sewer 4.09 62.68% 2.36 0.090 
Parks/recreation 2.94 37.50% 2.61 0.030 
Potable water 3.94 64.86% 2.44 0.070 
Solid waste 3.33 100.00% 2.12 0.080 
Traffic signal  2.91 75.00% 2.24 0.060 
Street/road 2.64 61.23% 2.40 0.048 
Correlation  0.083  0.909 
 
 
The above table shows the association between the asset specificity and network 
centralization, and between metering difficulty and network density. Although the 
network centralization varies with the asset specificity of the service, the positive 
association between the asset specificity and network centralization (Hypotheses 1 and 2) 
is not strong. The correlation shows that in general higher asset specificity is associated 
with higher network centralization, but the coefficient is very small indicating a very 
weak relationship. Other factors might be playing important role in affecting the structure 
of relationships. For example, in the case of the solid waste service, the legal requirement 
that the county takes countywide responsibility for the final disposal of the solid waste 
makes the county very central in the network relationship since all the cities in the county 
must dispose the waste at county managed disposal site. So, even if the asset specificity 
of solid waste is not that high in comparison to other services, the network centralization 
turned out to be the highest. 
 
The relationship between the metering difficulty of a service and the structure of network 
is much clear and in line with the theoretical expectations (hypothesis 3 and 4). When 
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metering difficulty is a problem, jurisdictions tend to enter into a pattern of relationship 
where often many jurisdictions are involved to watch each other to minimize the free-
riding or opportunistic behavior. Hence, as expected, we see a denser network in the case 
of higher metering difficulty of the service. For example, as the metering difficulty gets 
higher from 2.44 (water) to 3.60 (crime prevention), the network density – percentage of 
all ties in the network – also becomes greater from 7.0 % to 34.0 %. The correlation 
between the metering difficulty and the network density also shows high positive 
correlation coefficient (0.9) between the two. 
 
For other combinations of the asset specificity and metering difficulty, as outlined above, 
the pattern of network structure is less clear. What is emerging, though, from the analysis 
of this small set of diverse services is that for services that have high asset specificity and 
high metering difficulty, the pattern of relationship is more concentrated and dense. That 
is, there is a tendency for a relationship between smaller and a few large jurisdictions, but 
they would be tied to among other to minimize the problem arising out of metering 
difficulty. The fire and crime prevention services depict this tendency (above table). For 
other services (for example, sewer, solid waste, roads, etc) which have relatively high 
asset specificity but low metering difficulty, one could still observe concentrated 
relationships but with more towards one to one (bilateral) type.  
 
 
Conclusion 
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This paper set out with the objective of investigating the association between service 
characteristics and the structure of networked relationships between general purpose local 
jurisdictions in local public service delivery. It hypothesized that higher asset specificity 
would lead to greater degree centrality in network relationships; whereas when the 
metering difficulty is greater, the network relationship would tend to be more dense. It 
followed social network analysis to examine the hypotheses using inter-local agreement 
data from the Pinellas County in Florida.  
 
In general, the findings are mixed. Although the empirical examination shows a positive 
association between the asset specificity and the network centralization, the relationship 
between the two is very weak across the diverse services. On the other hand, the 
relationship between the metering difficulty and the network structure is consistent with 
the expectation. They have positive and substantial relationship indicating that when 
service metering is a major problem, they would like to have more of dense relationships 
to minimize free-riding or opportunistic behavior. 
 
This study has two major limitations. First, this is a case study of one county and eight 
services out of many services provided by local jurisdictions to their residents. So, the 
findings may not be easily generalized. Second, the information on inter-local service 
agreements is not comprehensive. However, the information is believed to be reasonably 
enough to analyze, at least, the pattern of inter-jurisdictional relations in local service 
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delivery19. Hence, conclusions drawn from the analysis should be seen in the light of this 
limitation. Nevertheless, the findings provided empirical basis to answer some of the 
complex questions of why inter-local service networks form as they do. Future research 
should attempt to concentrate investing these questions in large and diversified 
geographic areas employing multiple services (or their component activities) in order to 
overcome some of these limitations. It should also examine these questions over a longer 
time span to see how these networks evolve over time and whether the empirical 
relationship between the characteristics of service and structure of networks still holds 
true. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Ms. Elizabeth Freeman, Pinellas County Planning Department, informed me that, though the existing 
information is not comprehensive and does not include all the services and agreements, it reveals the 
general pattern as to how service delivery business is done in the Pinellas County. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Combined dimensions of asset specificity and metering difficulty and its affect on the 
cooperative arrangements in service production 
 
 
Asset specificity Metering 
difficulty 
High Low 
High Small – large jurisdictions 
 
More joint production 
Similar jurisdictions? 
 
More joint productions 
Low Small – large jurisdictions 
 
More bilateral arrangements 
Similar jurisdictions? 
 
More bilateral 
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Annex 2: The distribution of ties among jurisdictions by service in the Pinellas County 
 
 
Jurisdictions  fire crime sewer parks water 
solid 
waste traffic street/road Total 
Belleair 2 13 1 0 1 1 0 1 19
Belleair Beach 1 14 1 0 0 1 1 1 19
Belleair Bluffs* 10 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 15
Belleair Shore 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 5
Clearwater* 8 14 5 1 1 1 0 1 31
Dunedin* 10 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 19
Gulfport 1 13 1 0 1 1 1 1 19
Indian Rock Beach 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 6
Indian Shores 1 13 1 1 0 1 1 0 18
Kenneth City 1 13 0 0 1 1 1 1 18
Largo* 8 13 4 0 1 1 1 1 29
Madeira Beach 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9
North Redington 
Beach 3 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 7
Oldsmar 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 8
Pinellas Park* 10 13 3 0 3 1 1 1 32
Redington Beach 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 4
Redington Shores 2 14 1 1 0 1 0 0 19
Safety Harbor* 9 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 16
St. Pete Beach 1 13 1 1 2 1 1 0 20
St. Petersburg* 9 13 8 0 4 1 0 1 36
Seminole* 12 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 17
South Pasadena* 10 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 18
Tarpon Springs* 9 13 1 0 1 1 1 1 27
Treasure Island 1 13 1 0 0 1 1 1 18
Pinellas County 19 23 16 9 16 24 18 15 140
Column sum 134 207 54 18 42 48 36 30 569
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Annex 3: Network graphs 
 
Graph 1: Pinellas county fire prevention network 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Pinellas county crime prevention network  
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Graph 3: Pinellas county sanitary sewer network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4: Pinellas county parks/recreation network diagram  
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Graph 5: Pinellas county potable water networks 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6: Pinellas county solid waste networks  
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Graph 7: Pinellas county traffic signal network 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 8: Pinellas county street/road network 
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